Abstract. We present a purely model-theoretic semantics for disjunctive logic programs with negation, building on the infinite-valued approach recently introduced for normal logic programs [9] . In particular, we show that every disjunctive logic program with negation has a nonempty set of minimal infinite-valued models. Moreover, we show that the infinite-valued semantics can be equivalently defined using Kripke models, allowing us to prove some properties of the new semantics more concisely. In particular, for programs without negation, the new approach collapses to the usual minimal model semantics, and when restricted to normal logic programs, it collapses to the well-founded semantics. Lastly, we show that every (propositional) program has a finite set of minimal infinite-valued models which can be identified by restricting attention to a finite subset of the truth values of the underlying logic.
Introduction
The semantics of disjunctive logic programs with negation has been the subject of a number of recent research works [8, 2, 3, 11, 12, 4] . A comparative study of all these approaches easily leads to the conclusion that at present there is no consensus on what is the "right approach" to the semantics of disjunctive logic programs with negation. In other words, the quest for an intuitive and broadly acceptable semantic approach appears at present to be unfulfilled. Motivated by this state of affairs, we introduce in this paper a novel, purely model-theoretic semantics for disjunctive programs, which generalizes both the well-founded semantics of normal logic programs as well as the minimal model semantics of (negationless) disjunctive programs. An important characteristic of the new approach is that it is purely logical: the meaning of a program is characterized solely by examining its models (actually, its infinite-valued models, see below).
Having a purely logical semantics allows one to reason about programs using properties of the logic under consideration.
The present work builds on the infinite-valued approach that was recently introduced for normal logic programs [9] . In [9] a new infinite-valued logic is introduced and it is demonstrated that every normal logic program has a unique minimum model under this new logic; moreover, it is shown that when this model is collapsed to three-valued logic, it coincides with the well-founded semantics. It is therefore natural to ask: "can the infinite-valued approach be lifted to the class of disjunctive logic programs with negation giving in this way a respectable new semantics for this class of programs?".
In this paper we reply affirmatively to this question. In particular, we argue that the semantics of a disjunctive logic program with negation can be captured by the program's set of minimal infinite-valued models which, as we demonstrate, is always non-empty. Moreover, we show that the infinite-valued semantics can be equivalently defined using Kripke models. This alternative characterization allows us to prove properties of the new semantics more concisely. In particular, we prove that when restricted to programs without negation, the new approach collapses to the usual minimal model semantics, and when restricted to normal logic programs, it collapses to the well-founded semantics. Finally, we demonstrate that every program has a finite set of minimal infinite-valued models; actually, these models can be identified by restricting attention to a finite subset of the truth values of the underlying logic. We conclude with a comparison of the proposed approach with some other proposals for assigning semantics to disjunctive logic programs with negation that are related to well-founded semantics.
The Infinite-Valued Semantics
In this section we define the infinite-valued semantics for disjunctive logic programs with negation. Our presentation extends the one given in [9] for normal logic programs. We study the class of disjunctive logic programs: Definition 1. A disjunctive logic program is a finite set of clauses of the form:
where n ≥ 1 and k, m ≥ 0.
Note that in this paper we consider only finite programs; the results can be lifted to the more general first-order case (with a corresponding notational overhead). The basic idea behind the infinite-valued approach is that in order to have a purely model theoretic semantics for negation-as-failure, one should consider a richer logical framework than classical logic. Informally, we extend the domain of truth values and use these extra values to distinguish between ordinary negation and negation-as-failure. Consider for example the following (normal) program:
Under the negation-as-failure approach both p and s receive the value True.
We would argue, however, that in some sense p is "truer" than s. Namely, p is true because there is a rule which says so, whereas s is true only because we are never obliged to make q true. In a sense, s is true only by default. Our truth domain adds a "default" truth value T 1 just below the "real" truth T 0 , and a weaker false value F 1 just above ("not as false as") the real false F 0 . We can then understand negation-as-failure as combining ordinary negation with a weakening. Thus ∼ F 0 = T 1 and ∼ T 0 = F 1 . Since negations can effectively be iterated, our domain requires a whole sequence . . . , T 3 , T 2 , T 1 of weaker and weaker truth values below T 0 but above a neutral value 0; and a mirror image sequence F 1 , F 2 , F 3 , . . . above F 0 and below 0. In fact, in [9] a T α and a F α are introduced for all countable ordinals α; since in this paper we deal with finite propositional programs, we will not need this generality here. In [9] it is demonstrated that, over this extended domain, every normal logic program with negation has a unique minimum model; and that in this model, if we collapse all the T α and F α to True and False respectively, we get the threevalued well-founded model [10] . Considering the above example program, its minimum infinite-valued model is {(p, T 0 ), (q, F 0 ), (r, F 1 ), (s, T 1 )}, and therefore its well-founded model is {(p, T ), (q, F ), (r, F ), (s, T )}. In this paper we extend the results of [9] by demonstrating that every disjunctive logic program has a (non-empty) set of minimal infinite-valued models.
The above discussion can now be formalized as follows. We first need to define an infinite-valued logic whose truth domain consists of the following values:
Intuitively, F 0 and T 0 are the classical False and True values and 0 is the undefined value. The values below 0 are ordered like the natural numbers. The values above 0 have exactly the reverse order. In the following we denote by V the set consisting of the above truth values. A notion that will prove useful in the sequel is that of the order of a given truth value:
Definition 2. The order of a truth value is defined as follows: order(T n ) = n, order(F n ) = n and order(0) = +∞.
Let Q be a set of propositional symbols out of which our programs are constructed. Interpretations are then defined as follows: Definition 3. An infinite-valued interpretation is a function from the set Q of propositional symbols to the set V of truth values.
In the rest of the paper, the term "interpretation" will mean an infinite-valued one (unless otherwise stated). As a special case of interpretation, we will use ∅ to denote the interpretation that assigns the F 0 value to all members of Q.
Definition 4. The meaning of a formula with respect to an interpretation I can be defined as follows:
The notion of satisfiability of a clause can now be defined:
Definition 5. Let Π be a program and I an interpretation. Then, I satisfies a clause
We denote by L ∞ the infinite-valued logic induced by infinite-valued models.
Given an interpretation of a program, we adopt specific notations for the set of atoms of the program that are assigned a specific truth value and for the subset of the interpretation that corresponds to a particular order:
The following relations on interpretations will be used later in the paper:
Definition 7. Let I and J be interpretations and n < ω. We write
Definition 8. Let I and J be interpretations and n < ω. We write I n J, if for all k < n, I = k J and either I T n ⊂ J T n and I F n ⊇ J F n , or I T n ⊆ J T n and I F n ⊃ J F n . We write I n J if I = n J or I n J.
Definition 9. Let I and J be interpretations. We write I ∞ J, if there exists n < ω (that depends on I and J) such that I n J. We write I ∞ J if either I = J or I ∞ J.
In comparing two interpretations I and J we consider first only those variables assigned "standard" truth values (T 0 or F 0 ) by at least one of the two interpretations. If I assigns T 0 to a particular variable and J does not, or J assigns F 0 to a particular variable and I does not, then we can rule out I ∞ J. Conversely, if J assigns T 0 to a particular variable and I does not, or I assigns F 0 to a particular variable and J does not, then we can rule out J ∞ I. If both these conditions apply, we can immediately conclude that I and J are incomparable. If exactly one of these conditions holds, we can conclude that I ∞ J or J ∞ I, as appropriate. However, if neither apply, then I and J are equal in terms of standard truth values; they both assign T 0 to each of one group of variables and F 0 to each of another. In this case we must now examine the variables assigned F 1 or T 1 . If this examination proves inconclusive, we move on to T 2 and F 2 , and so on. Thus ∞ gives the standard truth values the highest priority, T 1 and F 1 the next priority, T 2 and F 2 the next, and so on.
It is easy to see that the relation ∞ on the set of interpretations is a partial order (i.e., it is reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric). On the other hand, for every n < ω, the relation n is a preorder (i.e., reflexive and transitive).
From the above discussion it should be now clear that the infinite-valued semantics of a disjunctive logic program with negation is captured by the set of ∞ -minimal infinite-valued models of the program. In Section 4 we'll see that this set is always non-empty. These ideas are illustrated by the following example: Example 1. Consider the program:
We examine the minimal models of this program. Obviously, in every minimal model either l or p must have the value T 0 (this is due to the second clause). Assume first that l is T 0 ; then this immediately gives the minimal model
Assume on the other hand that p is T 0 ; this implies that ∼ p is F 1 , and therefore either b or l must be F 1 (or greater). Therefore, we also have the minimal models {(l,
We denote by L min ∞ the non-monotonic logic induced by ∞ -minimal L ∞ models.
We present an alternative but equivalent representation of the infinite-valued semantics in terms of Kripke models. This representation is useful in several respects. First, as a heuristic device it may help in visualising and proving properties about the semantics (Section 5). Second, it may help to relate the semantics to other approaches based on possible-worlds frames, such as equilibrium and partial equilibrium logic ( [6, 4] ). Third, it may provide a basis in the future when searching for axiomatic systems capturing the underlying logic L ∞ .
Definition 10 (Centered linear frame).
A centered linear frame is a Kripke frame W, ≤ with a set of worlds W consisting of two distinguished elements w ∞ , w ∞ plus two ω-sequences w 0 , w 1 , . . . and w 0 , w 1 , . . . and a linear ordering '≤' satisfying, w i ≤ w i+1 , w i ≤ w ∞ , w i+1 ≤ w i , w ∞ ≤ w i and w ∞ ≤ w ∞ for any i < ω.
From Definition 10 it follows that w i ≤ w j for any i, j. Furthermore, we can depict both infinite chains w 0 , w 1 , . . . and . . . , w 1 , w 0 respectively bounded by w ∞ and w ∞ in the middle as follows:
Given any world w ∈ {w ∞ , w 0 } we define next(w) as the immediate successor of w in the chain, that is, next(w i ) = w i+1 , next(w ∞ ) = w ∞ and next(w i+1 ) = w i .
Definition 11 (Centered linear model).
A centered linear model is a Kripke model W, ≤, σ where W, ≤ is a centered linear frame and σ : Q×W −→ {0, 1} is a valuation such that σ(p, w) = 1, w ≤ u ⇒ σ(p, u) = 1 and σ(p, w 0 ) = 0 and σ(p, w 0 ) = 1 for all atoms p.
Given a Kripke model, we let W i , W i stand for the sets of atoms that are true at the respective worlds w i , w i , for i = 0, 1, . . . , ∞. From Definition 11 we conclude:
where in particular
An interesting way of describing a centered linear model M is using the sequence M = (W 0 , W 1 , . . . , W ∞ ) where each W i is a three-valued interpretation W i = (W i , W i ) so that atoms in W i , W i \ W i and Q \ W i are respectively seen as true, undefined and false up to order i. We may define the standard "less or equal truth" relation between pairs so that W i W j iff W i ⊆ W j and W i ⊆ W j . This allows rephrasing (2) as a simple chain W 0 W 1 · · · W ∞ with W 0 = ∅, Q assigning false to all atoms. Interpretation W ∞ contains the maximum truth in the chain and is important for comparisons with wellfounded semantics (Proposition 4 in Section 5). A three-valued interpretation like W = (W, W ) is said to be complete (no undefined atoms). We say that M = (W 0 , W 1 , . . . , W ∞ ) is i-complete for some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ∞} when W i is complete. Note that this means that ∀j (j ≥ i ⇒ W j = W i ) and W ∞ = W i .
Definition 12 (Routley frame).
A Routley frame is a triple W, ≤, * where W, ≤ is a Kripke frame and * : W → W is such that x ≤ y if y * ≤ x * .
Definition 13 (Zigzag model).
A zigzag model is a tuple W, ≤, * , σ where W, ≤, σ is a centered linear Kripke model and W, ≤, * is a Routley frame with * defined as: (w i ) * = w i and (w i ) * = w i for i = 0 and i = ∞; (w j+1 ) * = w j and (w j+1 ) * = w j for all j < ω.
The structure below shows the effect of * in solid lines, and the linear accessibility relation ≤ in dotted lines:
The name of "zigzag" comes from the path followed by successive applications of the * -function. Given a zigzag model M = W, ≤, * , σ , valuation σ is extended to an arbitrary formula ϕ by means of the usual conditions for positive connectives in intuitionistic logic, and for negation by the following condition: σ(∼ ϕ, w) = 1 iff σ(ϕ, w * ) = 0.
Proposition 1. For any zigzag model W, ≤, * , σ and any formula ϕ, σ(ϕ, w) = 1 and w ≤ u ⇒ σ(ϕ, u) = 1.
We say that M is a model of a theory Γ , written M |= Γ , if σ(ϕ, w 1 ) = 1 for all ϕ ∈ Γ (note that satisfaction is in world w 1 and not w 0 ).
Definition 14 (Induced valuation)
. Given a zigzag model M = W, ≤, * , σ we define its induced valuation functionM that assigns a valueM (ϕ) ∈ V to any formula ϕ as follows:
Notice that this assignment is well constructed due to condition (2) . Truth constants T and F can be incorporated as special atoms
. . , W ∞ ) be a zigzag model. Then the three-valued interpretation W ∞ corresponds to collapsing allM (p) = T i to true, allM (p) = F i to false andM (p) = 0 to undefined.
It is not difficult to see that for any infinite-valued interpretation I we can always build a zigzag model M whose induced valuation coincides with I on all atoms -the next theorem asserts that it also coincides for any arbitrary formula. Theorem 1. Let I be an infinite-valued interpretation and M a zigzag model such thatM (p) = I(p) for all atom p. Then I(ϕ) =M (ϕ) for any formula ϕ.
Proof. We begin defining the last world last(ϕ) in the chain at which formula ϕ does not hold so that last(ϕ) = w i whenM (ϕ) = T i , last(ϕ) = w i+1 when M (ϕ) = F i and last(ϕ) = w ∞ whenM (ϕ) = 0. Note that last(ϕ) ∈ {w ∞ , w 0 } and so next(last(ϕ)) (the first world at which ϕ holds) is always defined.
Thus, last(α) = last(β) impliesM (α) =M (β). We proceed now by structural induction.
1. For the base case, if ϕ is an atom p,M (p) = I(p) by construction. 2. If ϕ = α∧β, the last world at which ϕ does not hold is max(last(α), last(β)).
By Lemma 1 we concludeM (α ∧ β)=min(M (α),M (β)). If ϕ = α ∨ β the proof is analogous. 3. If ϕ = α → β, we have two cases: first, ifM (α) ≤M (β) then, by Lemma 1, last(α) ≥ last(β) and this means that any world w k satisfies w k |= α or w k |= β, excepting w 0 . In other words, last(α → β) = w 0 and soM (α → β) = T 0 . Otherwise, whenM (α) >M (β), by Lemma 1 we get last(α) < last(β). Then, the last world w k where w k |= α but w k |= β is last(β), and thus α → β is also false until last(β). As a result,M (α → β) =M (β). 4. If ϕ =∼ α. AssumeM (α) = T i , that is, w i |= α and w i+1 |= α. As w i = (w i+1 ) * and w i+1 = (w i+2 ) * we get w i+1 |=∼ α and w i+2 |=∼ α. But then, from Definition 14, we getM (α) = F i+1 . Analogously, whenM (α) = F i we have w i+1 |= α and w i |= α that, since w i+1 = (w i+2 ) * and w i = (w i+1 ) * , we get w i+1 |=∼ α and w i+2 |=∼ α and soM (α) = T i+1 . Finally, whenM (α) = 0 we have w ∞ |= α and w ∞ |= α, but as w ∞ = (w ∞ ) * and w ∞ = (w ∞ ) * , we obtain w ∞ |=∼ α and w ∞ |=∼ α that meansM (∼ α) = 0.
We can now alternatively define L min ∞ in terms of minimal Kripke models. Let M 1 = (W 0 , W 1 , . . . , W ∞ ) and M 2 = (U 0 , U 1 , . . . , U ∞ ) be a pair of zigzag models. We say that
Therefore, we have two alternative but equivalent definitions of the semantics of disjunctive logic programs with negation. In the rest of the paper, the two approaches will be used interchangeably.
Existence of Minimal Models
In this section we demonstrate that every disjunctive program has at least one minimal infinite-valued model. The proof is based on the dual of Zorn's Lemma 5 :
Lemma 2 (The dual of Zorn's Lemma). Every non-empty partially ordered set in which each downward chain has a lower bound, contains a minimal element.
First, notice that the set of models of a disjunctive logic program is nonempty, because the interpretation which assigns to every propositional atom the value T 0 is always a model. Second, notice that the set of models of a program is partially ordered by the ∞ relation. It suffices to show that every (possibly transfinite) downwards chain of models under ∞ , has a lower bound which is also a model of the program.
Therefore, consider a chain M of infinite-valued models of a disjunctive pro-
. We describe at an intuitive level the construction of a lower bound M of this chain. We first start with all models that belong to M and we "intersect" them at their zero'th level of truth values. This gives us a (partial) interpretation that will serve as the zero'th level of the lower bound M . We now consider only those elements of the chain M whose zero'th order part agrees with the partial interpretation we have just constructed. We repeat the above process with this new set of models and with the order one values. In the limit of this process, certain atoms may have not received a value; we assign to them the value 0. We now formalize the above construction:
Definition 15. Let S be a set of infinite-valued interpretations of a given program and n ∈ ω. Then, we define n S = {(p, T n ) | ∀M ∈ S, M (p) = T n } and n S = {(p, F n ) | ∃M ∈ S, M (p) = F n }. Moreover, we define n S = ( n S) ( n S).
Let Π be a program and let M be a downward chain of models of Π. We can now define the following sequence of sets of models of Π:
We now have the following lemma:
Lemma 3. For every n < ω, S n = ∅.
Proof. We demonstrate by induction on n that S n is a non-empty chain identical to M the only difference being that an initial part of M may be missing from S n . The base case is obvious. Assume the statement holds for n ie., that S n is a nonempty downward chain of the form M α ∞ M α+1 ∞ M α+2 ∞ · · · . For the induction step observe that since M α T n ⊇ M α+1 T n ⊇ · · · and M α F n ⊆ M α+1 F n ⊆ · · · , after an initial segment of this chain, all the members of the chain agree on their level n components. Therefore, S n+1 forms a non-empty chain. This establishes the desired result. We can now demonstrate the main theorem of this section which actually states that for every downward chain of models of a given disjunctive program, there exists a lower bound:
